

# Practical Guide

## OpenClaw: Securing in Production Auth, SSL, Reverse Proxy and Vault

Complete security checklist for AI agent deployments

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*An AI agent with access to your servers, emails, and credentials is a real attack surface. This guide documents how to secure OpenClaw in production.*

## 1. Why Security Is Critical Here

With self-hosting, security is your responsibility. The attack surface is real:

- The agent has filesystem access (SSH keys, tokens, configs)
- It can execute shell commands if the skill is enabled
- It receives instructions via messaging (prompt injection risk)
- Its Git workspace may contain secrets in commit history

■ *Per IDC 2025, 43% of enterprise AI incidents involve misconfigured access controls, not model vulnerabilities.*

## 2. Authentication

### Authorized Senders

OpenClaw filters messages by sender identifier. Only explicitly authorized senders trigger processing. Unknown messages are silently ignored.

### API Tokens

One token per integration, rotation every 90 days, immediate revocation when in doubt. Tokens never transit through the Git workspace.

### Channel Whitelist

The agent only listens on the configured private channel. Any other source is blocked at the gateway level before reaching the runtime.

*“Treat the agent like a system service account. Broad access = maximally restrictive input permissions.”*

## 3. HTTPS and SSL

The gateway interface must never be accessible over plain HTTP. Recommended architecture: Nginx reverse proxy + Let's Encrypt TLS certificate. The gateway listens locally, the reverse proxy handles TLS termination.

```
server {  
    listen 443 ssl;  
    server_name agent.your-domain.com;  
    ssl_certificate /etc/letsencrypt/.../fullchain.pem;  
    location / { proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:PORT; }  
}
```

■ *Automatic certbot renewal integrates as a system cron.*

## 4. Network Isolation

Absolute rule: the agent must not be accessible from the public internet. The gateway can remain entirely private. For remote admin access, a private virtual network allows reaching the gateway without exposing it.

Recommended UFW rules:

- Port 22 (SSH): management IPs only
- Port 443: closed if no public endpoint needed
- Gateway port: loopback only (127.0.0.1)
- Everything else: DROP by default

## 5. Secrets Management — Vault Is Mandatory

Credentials (API tokens, passwords, SSH keys) must never end up in flat files, Git history, or system prompts.

Absolute rules:

- No credentials in the Git workspace (even .gitignore'd — history keeps everything)
- No secrets in SOUL.md, MEMORY.md, AGENTS.md
- No tokens in system prompts
- Encrypted environment variables — injected at startup, not persisted

*“Scripts retrieve credentials dynamically from the vault at execution time. Expired session = inaccessible credential = limited blast radius.”*

## 6. Sandboxing — Least Privilege

### Dedicated System User

OpenClaw runs under a no-sudo account, with access only to the workspace, logs, and activated skill data directories. No access to system directories or other users' files.

### Limited Skills

Only activate skills actually in use. The exec skill is the most powerful and dangerous — explicitly document why it's present.

### Docker Isolation

For deployments requiring exec: run OpenClaw in a container with explicit volume mounts. If compromised, the blast radius stays confined to the container.

## 7. Audit and Logs

The workspace is a Git repository: every significant action is committed. What to monitor:

- Unusual commits: config file modifications, key additions, script creation
- Activity outside normal hours: a 3am action deserves investigation
- Denied access attempts in gateway logs
- Unusual token consumption spikes

■ BOTUM runs a cron that analyzes Git commits from the past 24h and generates a digest. Modification of a sensitive file = automatic alert.

## 8. Production Security Checklist

- Authorized senders configured and restricted to known identifiers
- HTTPS reverse proxy in front of the gateway (Nginx + Let's Encrypt)
- Gateway not exposed to the public internet
- UFW firewall configured — only necessary ports open
- Secrets vault in place — no plaintext credentials in Git
- Dedicated system user without sudo
- Skills limited to strict necessity
- Git logs — monitoring, alerts on sensitive files
- Token rotation scheduled (90 days max)
- Basic tests: verify gateway is unreachable from the outside

## Conclusion

Securing OpenClaw is not a 'phase 2' task. One hour of initial configuration, a few rules to maintain. Self-hosting gives total control — that control comes with total responsibility.

Post 4: Never expose your secrets in the AI context — how to structure SOUL.md and agent files.

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**Full article:** [blog.botum.ca/openclaw-securing-auth-ssl-reverse-proxy-vault](https://blog.botum.ca/openclaw-securing-auth-ssl-reverse-proxy-vault)

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